New terms are entering the public lexicon with the financial meltdown coinciding with the presidential campaign. The media would do well to explain “implicit guarantee” and “moral hazard” in their coverage, but naturally they prefer to concentrate on terms they already understand (“greed”) but do nothing to really explain the situation.
To complicate the situation, the candidates don’t seem to be able to explain the situation either, judging from the inane statments made so far. What are their economic advisors advising, exactly?
It’s not rocket science. And you don’t have to be a regular reader of the Wall Street Journal to understand. When you take a financial risk, and keep the payout when the risk pays off, but transfer the loss to others (such as the taxpayers) when the risk fails, that’s a “Moral Hazard”.
Likewise, if a large financial institution profits from favorable financial backing which is not explicit (such as actual cash reserves), but taken for granted by all who invest in the institution, that backing is called an “Implicit Guarantee”.
Either one of these distortions, if carried out on a large enough scale, can wreck a financial framework. Today, we’re faced with both simultaneously.
A lot of attention is being given to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie and Freddie. Lots of experts have been warning for at least a decade that the implicit guarantee of a federal bailout should the values of their portfolios fall during a housing slump exposes too much risk to the taxpayer, unless the size of their portfolios were kept relatively small and manageable. Supporters of the GSEs (especially their highly compensated executives, shareholders, and political patrons) denied the existence of the implicit guarantee and allowed the portfolios to grow, surpassing $5 trillion and making them the world’s largest holders of mortgage-backed securities.
When the housing downturn finally occurred, the critics were proved right and the taxpayers are now on the hook. Meanwhile, the shareholders were mostly bailed out, the executives kept their compensations and bonuses, and the politicians maintained their patronage. Implicit Guarantee, meet Moral Hazard.
In fairness to the GSEs, who maintain that they didn’t ask for the bailout (thereby maintaining fealty to their denial of the implicit guarantee), we have to ask: what about Bear Sterns and AIG? Nobody thought that these financial giants were backed by an implicit guarantee, but now we see that they were, at least in the same sense that the GSEs were.
So now all a company has to do is accumulate sufficient financial liability to enter the category of “too big to fail” and therefore earn the implicit guarantee from the U.S. government. What’s next, the Big Three and the airlines?
If our government is determined to follow this path to socialism, at least it owes the taxpayer the courtesy of not compounding it with more moral hazard, and not reward those who took the risk with our money.